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T hree months after the attacks ofSeptember 11, 2001, the New YorkTimes asked, “Is the Devil in the
Demographics?” (Sciolino, 2001). The article
examined the vulnerability of large cohorts of
unemployed youth to extremist ideology and
political recruitment, and speculated about the
hazards created by future youth cohorts in the
Middle East. In the post-9/11 era, however,
there has been very little academic research on
the relationship between youthful age structure
and warfare (three notable exceptions: Urdal,
2002; Hammel & Smith, 2002; Cincotta et al.,
2003). Literature on civil war and insurgency
has instead highlighted the role of other causal
factors such as the presence of valuable
resources, the degree of ethnic fractionalization,
and type of political regime, while downplaying
the importance of population age structure (see,
e.g., Collier & Hoeffler, 2001; Fearon & Laitin,
2003; Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2002).
While these factors likely play an important
role in the onset of civil war,1 the importance of
youthful age structure—particularly in insur-
gency-based civil wars2—should not be
ignored. The relationship between large youth
cohorts and civil war appears to have held
throughout history. For example, Herbert
Moller (1968) suggests that wars in pre-modern
and present-day Europe, including the rise of
the Nazi party in Germany, corresponded with
surges in the proportion of young men in the
population. Yale historian Paul Kennedy (1993)
argues that revolutions occur more often in
countries with large populations of “energetic,
frustrated, young men.”3 Even after controlling
for the fact that more youthful countries are less
developed and have more vulnerable political
regimes, my research finds that a large differ-
ence in the number of young adults compared
to the number of older adults—“relative cohort
size”—can help predict civil war, particularly
insurgent-based civil wars. 
“Excess Youth”: A Perfect Storm?
Some recent conflicts appear to lend credence to
the “excess youth” hypothesis. For example,
Philip Gourevitch (1998) describes how
Rwandan génocidaires were recruited from
among the jobless young men who were “wasting
in idleness and attendant resentments…Most of
the men were motivated by the opportunity to
drink, loot, murder, and enjoy higher living stan-
dards than they were previously accustomed to”
(page 93). In Sierra Leone, where young people
comprised 95 percent of the fighting forces in a
recent civil war, an NGO official explained that
the youth are “a long-neglected cohort; they lack
jobs and training, and it is easy to convince them
to join the fight” (Mastny, 2004, page 19). While
recent conflicts in Palestine and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo are mostly influenced by
other factors, both areas have among the highest
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ratios of young adults (15-29) to older working-
age adults (30-54) anywhere in the world.
Even though population growth has slowed
worldwide and will likely end within the next
century (Lutz et al., 2004), high fertility rates in
Africa and the Middle East will continue to
bring increasingly larger cohorts of young
adults for the next few decades. As Chart 1
illustrates, the ratio of young people to adults in
the developing world will continue to remain
well above the 1980 world peak for decades to
come. The National Intelligence Council
(2004) refers to these increasing youth cohorts
as part of a “perfect storm”—including failed
states, poor economies, and religious extrem-
ism—that will likely fuel conflict in certain
parts of the world for decades to come.
“Youth Bulge” Is a Misnomer
I believe that the mixed evidence on youthful
age structure and the risk of conflict is largely
due to the poor measurement of age structure
in most research. The term “youth bulge” is a
misnomer: although few authors use the same
definition of youth bulge, nearly all researchers4
measure it as the number of young people (gen-
erally between ages 15 and 24) as a percentage
of the adult population. A bulge, literally
defined as an “irregular swelling” (Abate,
1998), should be visible in the young adult sec-
tion of the age pyramid. Yet some so-called
youth bulges, such as that in contemporary Iraq
(Panel A of Chart 2), do not produce the bulge
shape characteristic of baby booms followed by
“baby busts” (Panel B of Chart 2). 
Relative Cohort Size: A Better
Measure of Age Structure
If not the bulge shape in and of itself, then why
do youthful populations influence the risk of
insurgency? I argue that the presence of young
adults is not as important as the degree of alien-
ation, frustration, and marginalization they
experience. These factors are subjective and dif-
ficult to measure; one way might be to examine
how much schools and the labor market must
expand to accommodate the incoming cohort
of teenagers. We can obtain a rough estimate by
measuring the current group of young adults
(ages 15 to 29) as a proportion of the number
of older working adults (ages 30 to 54) to find a
“relative cohort size,” after a similar measure
proposed by Richard Easterlin (1968, 1978,
1987).5
Relative cohort size can provide the missing
link between the population of young men and
the risk of civil war, especially if we consider
only insurgency-based civil wars (Staveteig,
2004a, 2004b, 2005). Easterlin’s relative cohort
size hypothesis delineates the relationship
between youthful populations and the econom-
ic and psychological frustrations that enable
political instability and, ultimately, civil war. As
a large relative cohort comes of age, the tension
produced by lack of success in the job and mar-
riage markets may, in the presence of other fac-
tors, render armed conflict a more appealing
option. While relative cohort size is unlikely to
be an immediate cause of civil war, large birth
cohorts often strain the schooling system and
labor market of a country, particularly a devel-
oping one, which can result in massive frustra-
tion, unemployment, reduced wages, and dis-
satisfaction—and arguably create a potential
army of young men who could be easily recruit-
ed in a rebellion.6 If economic opportunities
exist and expand in tandem with the youthful
population, as they did in most parts of East
Asia, enormous economic growth can result
from relatively large cohorts (Bloom &
Williamson, 1997; Bloom, Canning, &
Malaney, 1999). Yet in most developing coun-
tries, where economic opportunities are not
even sufficient for current youth cohorts, a rise
in the population entering the labor force is
likely to increase joblessness. 
In the United States, a large relative cohort
size—such as that created by teenage baby
boomers—is thought to have been one cause of
the social upheaval of the late 1960s and early
1970s (Macunovich, 2002; Easterlin, 1987). In
countries with less economic opportunity and
fewer channels for enacting social change, large
cohorts of young adults may choose more
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violent means of protest and social change.
Historical case studies have documented that a
youthful age structure in Cyprus, Palestine,
Algeria, and Laos increased the size of the pop-
ulation that could be mobilized, which in turn
influenced the intensity of the conflicts
(Choucri, 1974, page 191). 
One of the most important explanations of
the importance of relative cohort size is what
Easterlin (1978, 1987) calls “relative male
income,” which is the standard of living a man’s
income can buy relative to his father’s standard of
living. Relative male income is inversely related
to relative cohort size, other things being equal.
In the United States, the baby boomers were a
much larger birth cohort than their parents’
cohort, so people born later in the boom experi-
enced a much tighter entry-level job market than
those born early or before the boom. In this way,
one’s birth and fortune were interlinked: mem-
bers of smaller cohorts generally had an easier
time finding jobs and education, while equally
qualified members of larger cohorts struggled to
achieve the same standard of living. 
Not every society may respond the same way
to low relative male income, but large birth
cohorts in any country—particularly males—
must be accommodated by the school system
and eventually by the labor market. In popula-
tions with many women of child-bearing age,
population momentum will cause overall popu-
lation size to increase even decades after fertility
declines. The government will be required to
increase expenditures on services (such as roads,
schools, and hospitals) to accommodate each
new cohort. When the large birth cohort reach-
es adulthood, they will require more jobs than
vacated by previous cohorts. In deeply religious
contexts where pre-marital sex is forbidden and
men are expected to financially establish them-
selves prior to marriage, such a shortage of eco-
nomic opportunities can be particularly frus-
trating, as the shortage can prevent even educat-
ed adults from entering into marriage and
achieving cultural notions of adulthood.
Research on suicide bombers, for example, has
shown that many are well-educated and highly
capable, yet lack the economic opportunities
necessary to establish themselves (Sprinzak,
2000; Pape, 2005)
Measuring the Importance of
Relative Cohort Size
To test the importance of relative cohort size
in the probability of civil war, I built a dataset
that combined information on civil wars
(Strand et al., 2004), insurgency-based civil
wars (Heidelberg Institute for International
Conflict Research, 1999), national per capita
income (Heston et al., 2004), demographic fac-
tors (United Nations, 2003), political regime
(Marshall et al., 2004), and other relevant trade
and economic variables (World Bank, 2002).
The data span 10 five-year periods from
1950–2000 in 174 countries. 
In accordance with previous research, my
baseline model found that countries with uncon-
solidated political regimes,7 high infant mortality
rates, lower per capita incomes, and larger popu-
lation sizes consistently had a higher risk of civil
war onset (Staveteig, 2005). Infant mortality rate
(which is often used as a proxy to measure devel-
opment) and per capita income were nearly
equally strong predictors of civil war onset, and
both measures were highly correlated to one
Even after controlling for the fact that more
youthful countries are less developed and have
more vulnerable political regimes, my research
finds that a large difference in the number of
young adults compared to the number of older
adults—“relative cohort size”—can help predict
civil war, particularly insurgent-based civil wars.
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another. I ultimately chose to use
only the infant mortality rate in my
models because the data over time
and country were more complete.
None of the other factors that
researchers suggested are impor-
tant—urbanization, per capita
income growth, secondary school
enrollment, and population densi-
ty—measurably improved the base-
line model.
Calculating youth as a percent-
age of the entire population (“non-
relative cohort size”) did not deter-
mine the onset of civil wars (insur-
gency-based or otherwise). On the
other hand, comparing a specific
population of youth to a specific
population of adults (relative
cohort size) and comparing a specif-
ic population of youth to all adults
(“quasi-relative cohort size”) both
strongly predicted the risk of civil
war. While the average country in
the dataset experienced a 12 percent chance of
any kind of civil war erupting in any given
five-year period, differences in relative cohort
size could swing that risk as low as 6 percent
and as high as 28 percent, holding all other
factors equal.8 For insurgency-based civil wars
the results were even stronger. While the aver-
age country faced a 9 percent chance of an
insurgency-based civil war starting in any
given five-year period, relative cohort size
could make this risk as low as 2 percent or as
high as 38 percent. Higher levels of infant
mortality and an unconsolidated political
regime could greatly increase this risk.
Could these results be influenced by the
countries’ different levels of development?
Using the United Nations’ classification scheme
for more-developed and least-developed coun-
tries,9 I found that even within these broad
development categories, differences in age
structure were significant and measurable pre-
dictors of conflict. 
Interestingly, it appears that future relative
cohort size could also be used to predict con-
flict. Relative cohort size can be measured up to
10 years in advance using current data on pop-
ulation age structure. For example, the ratio of
future young adults (e.g., the current 5- to 19-
year-olds) to future older adults (the current
20- to 44-year-olds)—combined with current
information about infant mortality, population
size, and governance—can predict whether
conflict will occur 10 to 15 years from now
almost as well as waiting 10 years to measure
the actual relative cohort size. This finding
could help develop conflict-prevention policies;
by identifying large relative cohorts up to 10
years before they reach young adulthood, poli-
cymakers and funders might devise better
strategies for easing the transition, and thus
reduce the chances of conflict. 
Conclusion
Just as developed countries now face future
pension shortfalls and other challenges associat-
ed with aging populations, less developed coun-
tries face the opposite problem: excess youth. In
Chart 1: Relative Cohort Size Wordwide 1950–2050
Note: “Relative Cohort Size” is defined as the ratio of population aged 15-29 to population
aged 30-54. 
Source: Author's calculations from United Nations' World Prospects Data: The 2002 Revision
[CD-ROM].
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2005, 1.9 billion people—nearly one-third of
the world’s population—are under the age of
15. Ninety percent of these youth live in less-
developed countries.10 Even if fertility decreas-
es, large birth cohorts in developing countries
are unlikely to wane for a few decades. As these
large birth cohorts enter adulthood, the risk of
insurgent civil wars increases. When relative
cohort size peaked in the United States (as baby
boomers entered young adulthood) in 1975,
there was nearly a one-to-one ratio between the
number of 15- to 29-year-olds and the number
of 30- to 54-year-olds. In the average least-
developed country, that ratio is expected to stay
above one until 2035. The strain on school sys-
tems and labor markets in these countries will
be profound. In absolute numbers, the increase
in youth cohorts will be enormous. 
Of course, it is not likely that a high relative
cohort size will be the inciting cause of conflict
in least-developed countries. A very youthful
population is an important factor, among oth-
ers, that flares up only under certain conditions
or “sparks.” But at the same time, sparks can
only trigger violent conflicts when contextual
factors enable them. If alternative means of
social change are available, violence will be less
appealing. A large relative cohort is not in and
of itself a sufficient cause for civil war, but a
smaller relative cohort size makes it more diffi-
cult for conflicts to erupt.11 Even after control-
ling for the fact that more youthful countries
are less developed and have more vulnerable
political regimes, my research finds that relative
cohort size is an important predictive factor for
civil war, particularly insurgent-based civil wars. 
The link I found between relative cohort size
and civil war would have been even stronger if I
had looked at the sub-national level, as insur-
gent groups often come from sub-populations
with high relative cohort size (for example
Chechens in Russia, Northern Irish in the
United Kingdom, and Palestinians in Israel).12
Recent suicide bombings in London and riots
Chart 2: Age Structure in Iraq 2005 and the United States 1980
Note: The term “youth bulge” is a misnomer: all contemporary definitions of the term would rank contemporary Iraq (Panel A) as
having a larger youth bulge than the United States did in 1980 (Panel B), despite the fact that Panel B shows a more characteristic
“bulge” shape. 
Source: United Nations’ World Prospects Data: The 2002 Revision [CD-Rom]. The 2005 estimate for Iraq is based on the medium-
range projections from 2002. 
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in France are important reminders that devel-
oped countries are not immune to violent rebel-
lions from youthful sub-populations. But these
events alone do not justify restricting immigra-
tion; instead, I believe that they signal the
urgent need to improve integration and equali-
ty. Industrialized countries facing major pen-
sion shortfalls due to a high ratio of retirees to
workers could mitigate the problem by hiring
young workers from the developing world.
Even though immigration and integration are
politically sensitive topics, developed countries
should consider projected pension shortfalls
and the cascading security risk of large youth
cohorts in the developing world when debating
immigration and integration policies.
Easing the transition of large birth cohorts
into adulthood and developing viable nonvio-
lent means of political change could help pre-
vent civil war in countries where relative cohort
size is expected to be high. Methods might
include increasing the number of opportunities
available for young people (perhaps by offering
employers credits for hiring entry-level workers,
expanding regional security forces, or using
international aid to create an internal volunteer
corps), expanding tertiary schooling options (if
appropriate jobs will later be available), ensur-
ing universal suffrage for young adults, and
maintaining a fair and open political system.
A better understanding of contextual factors
leading to civil war may improve our ability to
prevent it in the future. Research on the causes
of civil war should incorporate measures of rela-
tive cohort size. Unraveling the background fac-
tors that put a country at risk for conflict is
arguably more important than finding the
immediate “spark” of conflict, as policy is much
better equipped to address structural problems
than immediate factors. In many countries
around the world, we cannot prevent large rela-
tive youth cohorts over the next two decades,
but understanding the role of relative cohort
size and planning wisely could help reduce the
risk of future insurgency-based13 civil wars. 
Notes
1. I define a civil war as an “internal armed con-
flict” according to the Armed Conflict Dataset from
the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo
(Strand et al., 2003; Gleditsch et al., 2002).
2. For the purposes of this paper, insurgency-based
civil wars are defined as violent crises or wars involving
a non-state group as a primary actor in the conflict,
using the KOSIMO dataset (Heidelberg Institute for
International Conflict Research, 1999). 
3. Other authors have found a connection between
“excess young men” and the outbreak of violence
(Cincotta et al., 2003; Goldstone, 1991, 2001;
Hammel & Smith, 2002; Mesquida & Wiener, 1999;
Urdal, 2002). 
4. See, for example, Cincotta et al. (2003); Choucri
(1974); Goldstone (2002); O’Brien (2002); Mesquida
and Wiener (1999); and Urdal (2002).
5. As youth unemployment rates are difficult to
measure, particularly in the developing world, a rela-
tively large youth cohort is a good proxy for the oppor-
tunity structure in a country. Hammel and Smith
(2002) call the difference between adjacent cohorts the
“demographically-induced unemployment rate.”
6. Youthful populations in and of themselves are
unlikely to be a sufficient condition for civil war:
insurgent groups must be able to form a coherent col-
lective identity with which to challenge state authority,
and they must also find opportunities for collective
action (Diehl & Gleditsch, 2001). As Walter (2004)
asserts, enlistment in a rebel group is only likely to be
attractive “when two conditions hold. The first is a sit-
uation of individual hardship or severe dissatisfaction
with one’s current situation. The second is the absence
of any nonviolent means for change” (page 371). 
7. As measured by the square of the political regime
score assigned by the Polity IV dataset (Marshall,
Jaggers, & Gurr, 2004). 
8. Based on the observed range of relative cohort
sizes from the dataset.
9. According to the United Nations, highly devel-
oped countries include those in Europe, North
America, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. The least
developed countries include most of sub-Saharan
Africa and parts of Asia and the Middle East. I put the
remaining countries in a third category entitled “mod-
erately developed.”
10. Author’s calculations based on figures from
Population Reference Bureau (2005).
11. The main exceptions are conflicts in the for-
mer Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, where relative
cohort size was small but other factors enabled pro-
tracted conflict.
12. Based on information about fertility rates from
“Chechnya has highest birth rates in Russia” (2005),
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Ruddock et al. (1998), and Population Reference
Bureau (2005).
13. Insurgent groups cannot always be deemed
morally wrong (consider, for example, anti-colonial
movements in many countries), but when groups feel
they have no other means besides violence to enact
social change, the costs for society can be enormous.
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